Qatar and the Israel-Hamas conflict: Hybrid mediation power on display

Here, Professor Vassilis K. Fouskas explains the diplomatic and mediative powers of Qatar and its influence in the current Israel-Hamas conflict

In the – certainly not so good – old times, holding a knight to ransom was common practice between combatants. Sadly, it also happens today. Last September, Iran released five US citizens accused of espionage in return for $6bn oil revenue frozen in South Korean banking institutions. (1)

Turkey’s president, Tayyip Erdogan, wanted to trade Turkish imam, Fethullah Gülen, a US resident accused of organising the coup of 2016 against Erdogan, with Andrew Brunson, an American pastor running a small Christian church in Izmir – a city on the Aegean shores of Turkey dominated by Greeks, Armenians, and Jews before 1922.

Hamas have been pursuing the same logic. The fate of some 240 Israeli hostages taken by Hamas on their 7 October raid was slated for playing a key role in the conflict. But there was a caveat, known as, Qatari mediating power and skills.

4-day ceasefire between Israel and Hamas

Qatar has brokered a 4-day ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, managing to convince Israel to release 150 prisoners in exchange for the release of 50 Israeli hostages.

Qatar’s role in conflict mediation is not a recent phenomenon. Qatar’s role as a conflict mediator goes back many years. As a third-party mediator, Qatar has been exercising such diplomatic abilities since the 1990s.

Mediation, in particular hybrid mediation involving both peripheral and great powers, has become a long-standing aspect of its foreign policy. For this purpose, it financed and developed a robust infrastructure, which includes diplomatic and intelligence training use of high-tech hybridity in optimizing negotiating results leading to peaceful solutions, all the while capitalising on the openings for peace offered by the great powers.(2)

Qatar has brokered peace agreements on multiple occasions

Qatar has brokered peace agreements on multiple occasions, the most successful of which were – apart from the aforementioned US-Taliban deal: Lebanon in 2008; Yemen in 2010; Darfur in 2011 and Gaza in 2012.(3) More recently, in 2020-21, Qatari professional diplomats, with the assistance of the experienced US diplomat, Zalmay Khalilzad, brokered the US-Taliban agreement calling, among others, for an intra-Afghan dialogue and negotiation until permanent and comprehensive peace is restored in Afghanistan.

Qatar is neither inexperienced nor its involvement in the Israel-Hamas conflict is new. The current deal may discontinue. We do not know. Also, we do not know if there are secret annexes in the deal. What we know is that Qatar, once more, displayed its hybrid diplomatic skills from the outset, since 7^th of October, involving such peripheral and global powers, as Egypt and the USA – so far, we have no evidence of Turkey’s involvement, despite its excellent relations with Qatar.

Through its contacts with Hamas leadership – Qatar has provided Hamas with a political office in Doha – and working diligently, Qatari diplomats and agencies knew all the names and identities of Israeli hostages, ensuring during the negotiations the release of three US citizens among the 50 Israelis to be released – one of them a three-year old girl.

Qatar has also managed to secure from Israel that no Palestinian will be arrested in Gaza during the 4-day lull. Qatari and Egyptian agencies are now working on logistical challenges regarding the safe delivery of hostages and the release of prisoners.(4)

But what also deserves explanation is where does this Qatari diplomatic capacity and efficiency stem from? How did Qatar built its reputation as mediator and “diplomatic hub” making itself indispensable? (5) To answer this question, we need to momentarily migrate from the realm of politics to that of economics, acknowledging the glue binding the two domains in real life: institutions.

Qatar’s diplomatic infrastructure and efficient hybrid networking rest on its wealth management, investment capacity and complex connections, including personal connections, in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa) and beyond, especially in the United States. Politically as well as economically, Qatar has been a full participant in integration processes since the inception of neo-liberal globalisation in the 1970s.(6)

Qatar us one of the top ten richest countries in the world

In per capita income, Qatar is one of the top ten richest countries in the world and the wealthiest in the Arab world. By comparison, in 2020, Italy’s GDP per capita was $39,000, whereas Qatar’s was $85,300. Qatar is the second largest exporter of natural gas in the world, with some 85% of its export earnings coming from hydrocarbons.

The surplus of dollars from the gas and petroleum trade is invested in American T-bills, creating a structure of permanent inter-dependency between it and the United States.(7) Leaving OPEC in 2018 in order to become a key world supplier on the global LNG market, Qatar was soon to emerge among one of the three leaders in the field, together with Russia and the United States.

For some time now, the Qatari elites have been firm believers that cleaner fuels “have a brighter future than oil”. (8) Through its Investment Promotion Agency, Qatar business consortia drives the cleantech industry in the entire MENA region with $75 bn investment fund. (9)

Qatar is a leading power in the Agri-tech revolution, outperforming many countries across the world, especially in terms of food security. (10) It has 25% stakes in Iraq’s oil industry, partnering up with Western energy business clusters and projects.

The UK itself will receive £4 bn investment from Qatar to create climate tech unicorns in Southern England. (11) All in all, Qatar is a full participant in globalisation’s global production networks and supply chains, using cutting edge technology upholding the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals.

Hybridity, “trans-nationalisation” and “slicing-up production processes” across regions in order to re-connect them at a finishing assembly point is part and parcel of globalisation. (12) Qatar’s institutions bind politics and economics in inextricable ways, and political agencies become the mirror image of hybrid entrepreneurship, generating hybrid political entrepreneurs themselves. Hybrid political entrepreneurship serves Qatar’s regional and global economic interests seeking peace and cooperation, rather than not conflict and war.

This, apart from making Qatar stand out among many other regional powers, generates a powerful dynamic whose full potential has been on full display in the ongoing Hamas-Israel conflict. My guess is that this will continue because Qatari elites have more than one ways of making themselves indispensable to all parties concerned. (13)

References

1. US agrees to release $6bn in Iran funds as part of deal to free detained Americans | Iran | The Guardian.
2. About CHS (chs-doha.org).
3. Qatar’s evolving role in conflict mediation: Mediterranean Politics: Vol 0, No 0 (tandfonline.com).
4. The Secret Negotiations That Led to the Gaza Hostages Deal (usnews.com).
5. Qatar’s Growing Role as a Humanitarian and Diplomatic Hub – Gulf International Forum (gulfif.org)
6. Economy, from The Report: Qatar 2022 – Oxford Business Group.
7. Welcome to a new era of petrodollar power (economist.com).
8. Why Qatar left OPEC | OPEC | Al Jazeera.
9. Qatar drives cleantech industry in MENA region with $75bn investment opportunity   | Arab News.
10. Qatar leads MENA’s agritech revolution | The Peninsula Qatar.
11. Qatar plans £4bn UK investment to create climate tech unicorns (uktech.news).
12. Growing World Trade: Causes and Consequences (brookings.edu).
13. ‘They are buying something’: the cash, gifts and arms cementing the Qatari-UK relationship | Qatar | The Guardian.

This piece was written and provided by Vassilis K. Fouskas, a Professor of politics & economics at the Royal Docks School of Business & Law, the founding editor of the Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies (Routledge-Taylor & Francis, 8 issues annually since 1998) and the Co-Director of the Centre for the Study of States, Markets & People (STAMP) at the University of East London.